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OCCUPATION OF TACOGDOCHES
ROBERT L. AND PAULINE JONES
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During 1836 Nacogdoches, the Sabine, and East Texas came to be for
people of the l;nited States more than strange names and unfamiliar loca·
tions on a map. The revolution in Texas aroused sympathy in the States and
seemed to give the administration an opportunity to improve its image at
home and perhaps secure territory it had heretofore sought without success.
Washington realized any plan made on the Potomac would emphasize the
significance of the unmarked boundary from the Gulf to Red River. There-
fore, General Edmund P. Gaines, in command of the Western Department
of the Army, was ordered to assume supervision of the situation along
this border. In his effort to carry out instructions, promote his own as
well as what he believed to be the will of the public, and the personal desire
of the President, he stationed troops at Nacogdoches. This resulted in a
diplomatic break with l\lexico, a bit of political legerdemain by President
Jackson, and revived, as a public issue, the long-standing rivalry among the
ranking generals of the army.
The United States and Mexico had not found a basis for the cordial
relationship each had expected when the latter became an independent
republic. Nevertheless, on April 5, 1831, they signed a treaty of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation, the 33l'd article of which provided that the two
governments would strive to maintain peace and harmony among the
Indians Hwho inhabit the lands adjacent to the lines and rivers which form
the boundaries of the two countries." The better to attain this objective,
each "expressly" agreed to prevent Indians living in its territory from
committing hostilities against either citizens or of Indians living within
the other's jurisdiction. This provision was destined to be most troublesome.1
With the outbreak of the Texas Revolution, Indians in the northeast
who had long sought, without success, recognition of legal title to the land
on which they lived, appeared to be presented an improved bargaining
position. Since Mexico had least to lose, it seemed logical, to the Anglo-
Saxon mind, that she could afford to make greater concessions. Acting upon
this assumption, the provisional government and many private citizens in
Texas appealed to the United States for help of any and every description.
Especial emph~sis was placed upon the prevention of Indians crossing the
border to aid Mexico.2 Great sympathy as well as a desire to aid was found
in the southern states. To assure the public that the government was aware
of conditions, on December 7, 1835, President Jackson reported to Con-
gress that a policy of strict neutrality had been adopted in regard to the
situation in Texas and 'lit has been thought necessary to apprise the Gov-
ernment of Mexico that we should require the integrity of our territory to
be scrupulously respected by both parties."3
Washington, sensitive. to public opinion, concluded that Mexican author-
ities might seek to recruit Indians along the unmarked Arkansas-Louisiana
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boundary to help crush the insurrection. Some of these lived or had. recently
lived in the United States, therefore, their use in a military capacity would
be a violation of the treaty. Since General Gaines was at the time directing
the war against the Seminoles, a Jetter dated January 22, 1836, from the
office of the Adjutant General called his attention to the situation.• The
following day Secretary of War Lewis Cass sent him orders to repair to a
position near the westem boundary of Louisiana and assume personal
direction of all troops along that frontier. He was told it was the duty of
the United States to "remain entirely neutral and. to cause their neutrality
to be respected." For this purpose the 6th regiment was to be ordered t.o
Ft. Jesup. These with troops in Western Louisiana and the country beyond
the Mississippi and south of the Missouri, he was advised, might be used
to enforce the administration's decision.:;
The order reached General Gaines at New Orleans on March 28. He set
out for his new post immediately and from Baton Rouge the following day
wrote the Secretary of War that if he found "any disposition on the part of
the Mexicans or their red allies to menace our frontier, I cannot but deem
it my duty to ... anticipate their lawless movements, by crossing our
supposed or imaginary national boundary, and meeting the sa\·age ma-
rauders where\'er to be found in their approach toward our frontier." In
case the department approved, he would need mounted volunteers.6
On his way toward the front, Gaines heard alarming reports of Indien
hostilities. April 4 he arrived at Natchitoches and the following day sent
Lieutenant Joseph Bonnell to the Caddo village in search of infonnation. At
the same time he ordered commanders at Ft. Towson and Ft. Gibson to turn
back any Texans or Mexicans who might attempt to cross the boundary,
also to prevent, as far as possible, Indians living in the United States from
joining in the hostilities.;
On April 8, Gaines wrote Secretary Cass that he had ordered six or
eight companies of the 7th infantry at Ft. Gibson to sen'ice between
Ft. Towson and Ft. Jesup. He also reported calls upon the governors of
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee for a brigade each and the governor
of Alabama for a battalion of \·0Iunteers.8 He explained to the go\~ernors
that the President considered it the duty of the Cnited States. in accord-
ance \vith treaty obligations, flto remain entirely neutral and cause their
neutrality to be respected-peaceably, if possible; forcibly if necessary."
To implement this decision he informed the various tribes along the border,
also those on the Red and Arkansas rivers, that the United States was
dete.nnined to prevent any incursion into Texas. He called upon the chiefs
to warn their people of the necessity for a scrupulous adherence to terms
of the treaty of 1831, :md explained that he would not hesitate to use the
forces under his command to prevent further violation or to punish that
which had already occurred.o
Manuel Flores, General Gaines believed, was commissioned by Mexican
authorities to persuade the lndians to join in a war of extermination. He
had inionnation that this agent had recently been on Red river and pro-
duced considerable e."(citement among the Caddoes and other tribes, some
of whom had crossed into Texas. These events made it necessary for him
East Tezas Historical Journal 25
to decide whether or not to stop the movement by force before the whites
on both sides of the boundary were placed at the mercy of the savages.
Since it would take at least a month, which might prove fatal to a large
section of the frontier, to submit the issue to the President, and since
General Gaines believed he knew what President Jackson would say, he d~
dded to move ahead when a sufficient number of mounted men were
available10
Reports of atrocities continued to reach Natchitoches. Early in the
morning of April 14, General Gaines was infonned that some 1500 to 2000
Indians had joined about 1000 mounted Mexicans, said to be the detach-
ment whleb Colonel Travis's servant Jo had reported left San Antonio after
the faU of the Alamo, taking the Bastrop road. Four days earlier the
combined force was rnmored to have ucamped about 60 miles from Nacog·
doches and 30 north of the road leading from that place to Trinity." It
was supposed at least 300 families lived along the route this enemy was
reported following. ll Immediately upon receipt of the infonnation, General
Gaines ordered five companies of the 3rd and 8th companies of the 6th
infantry to move from Ft. Jesup to the Sabine river, "where they went
into encampment on the site of Wilkinson's former camp," the place des·
ignated thereafter as Camp Sabine. These troo?S carried thirty-five rounds
of ammunition and twelve days rations; they also had two field pieces
with seventy-five rounds of ammunition for each. t2
The General followed the troops and estahlished his headQuart..e.rs at
the camp. Along the road he "met several hundred Texians women and
children with some men retiring under the influence of great panic."
Most of these, he learn~d, were from the neighborhood of Nacogdoches,
fleeing from the reported victorious Mexicans aIld their red allies. Upon
reaching the Sabine, he was surprised to hear no confirmation of additional
Indian hostilities. He learned of only one man's baving been killed and
the circumstances, as reported, did not indicate a spirit of general hostility.
He decided to hold the troops east of the river but to warn the Indians,
especially the Cherokees, through their chief Bowles, that the United
States would punish them if they attacked settlers along either side of
the boundary.11
In the meantime, Lieutenant Bonnell had visited the Caddoes and learned
that Flores had been at the vitlages seeking to persuade the Indians to at-
tack t..'le Te.xans. They had refused, saying they wished to live in peace and
since all Americans were kin, if the redmen attacked those on one side
of the boundary those on the other side would come and destroy them.
Gaines received Bonnell's report on April 20. The same day he wrote
Cass of the faU of the Alamo, uthe runaway scrape," and Houston's
retreat. The Mexican successes, be was convinced would encourage more
Indian hostility.1t
Since little unfriendly action by the Indians could be observed, he
feared the administration's policy might be questioned, the movement of
troops criticized and demands made that the call for volunteers be rescinded.
To guard against such possibilities, General Gaines wrote the Secretary of
War justification lor what had been done. He pointed out that Flores
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was a "zealous and efficient" agent seekin,K to encourage the savages
to strike. Some oC the Caddoes were admittedly hesitant but most of the
warriors were away, reported to be hunting, but a number of circumstances
indicated they might be gathering with other and more numerous tribes
on the upper branches of Red River where \\-;th mounted Comanches
they could descend upon settlements along the Sabine and Neches rivers.
Such a move in cooperation with the Cherokees would demoralize the
frontier by destroying hundreds of lives and millions DC dollars worth of
property. [n view of these facts, Gaines urged that it was highly desirable
for his plan to be pursued and the volunteers be on the frontier as soon
after May 1 as possible. By that time grass would be sufficient. supple-
mented with a little com, to sustain the horses. This was also the season
when water and weather were most favorable for the troops and the
Indians were most vulnerable.l~
To those familiar with Indian warfare, there were other arguments
that supported the proposed concentration. The earliest possible rendezvous
was desirable, for in fighting the redmen, experience had proved that the
best plan was to employ a sufficient number of mounted troops to cap·
ture or punish the first offenders. Most people on the frontier believed
that should there be no fighting the presence of dragoons would be
helpful since they would encourage a spirit of caution in the Indians,
confidence in the settlers, and pro,,;de experience for the troops. All these
were needed, perhaps the last was the greatest weakness in the military,
for it was almost totally without topographical information essential
in border warfare. 1lI
It appears that General Gaines correctly interpreted the will of the gov-
ernment, for before his report reached Washington, he was authorized
to extend activities into the disputed territory. In a letter dated April
25, in reply to his of March 29, the Secretary of War notified him that
the Mexican government had been told the army should take such position
as would enable it to preserve the territory of the United States and
Mexico from Indian outrages as well as protect the territory of the
United States from violation by Mexicans, Te.'Cans, or Indians. Under no
circumstances, however, was a station to be taken beyond "Old Fort
Nacogdoches which is within the United States as claimed by Wash-
ington." In case troops did go beyond the boundary, they would be with-
drawn when the line was located. Cass wrote Uhut you will please observe,
that this permission will not be exercised unless you find such an ad-
vanced position necessary to afford due security to the frontier in conse-
quence of the unsettled state of things beyond you.un
Directions from Washington were broad and the General indicated
no desire to operate within narrow limits. On May 4 Secretary eass
wrote him that his call for volunteers had been approved, and since the
theater of operations was so far from the seat of govemment, much would
be left to his discretion. He was told, however, to keep in mind the two
objectives of his mission: first, the protection of the frontier; and second,
a strict performance of the neutral duties of the United States. He was
cautioned to be careful to do nothing which would give just cause of
offense to any other government and at the same time not permit the
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frontier to "be invaded by any force whatever!' He was to warn all
concerned that he would use his best effort to keep any troops from "march-
ing toward our frontier" and if such attempt were made, he would "repel
and disperse it."18
Gaines had determined to make sure his intentions and movements were
neither misunderstood nor misinterpreted below the border. On April 25,
he addressed letters to the commanders-in-chief of the Mexican and Texan
armies. He wrote that he was on the frontier to restrain the Indians
residing within the United States from crossing the unmarked boundary
and from committting depredations upon either side of the line, also to
maintain the neutrality of the United States. E. A. Hitchcock, acting
Inspector General, was selected to deliver the message and he was
authorized to "freely communicate the powers, views and purposes of the
commanding General." He was specifically instructed to warn the com-
manders against "any movement 1'n arms across the Sabine bay, or any
of the principal water courses emptying into that bay, or across the country
lying north thereof, and between the said waters and the Red River near
Fort Towson; or across any other part of the said unmarked or supposedly
marked boundary line between the United States and Mexico." He was fur-
ther authorized to inform the commanders that employment of "Indians be-
longing to, 01' usually residing in the nations or tribes residing on the
United States side of the above mentioned boundary line," would bring
the entire American force against them and such summary punishment
inflicted "upon the Indians as well as those who may be found acting
with and aiding them as shall afford to the said frontier inhabitants
that protection and security from the cruelties of savage war, which the
laws of war and civilized nations warrant." General Gaines was to be
represented as believing these measures were expressly provided for in
the 33rd article of the treaty between the United States and Mexico. lIl
By April 28 Gaines had received reliable reports of the battle of San
Jacinto and of rumors that the Indians were disposed to return to their
villages and plant corn. This changed the situation and he withdrew the
call for volunteers.":!o The capture of Santa Anna, the treaty of Velasco,
and the retreat of Mexican troops from Texas seemed to settle the issue.
General Gaines was well pleased with his handling of the situation and
believed he had prevented widespread Indian hostilities along the border.21
Soon, however, it became known that authorities in Mexico City refused
to sanction the abandonment of Texas. General Jose Urrea replaced Gen-
eral Vicente FHisola in command of the army with orders to halt the
retreat, regroup the scattered forces and return to the fray. When this
information spread through Texas, Indian activities were again viewed
with apprehension.22
When the Mexican troops assembled at Matamoros and displayed in-
dications of renewing the war, the situation on the Sabine again changed.
General Gaines was convinced tribesmen had earlier committed depreda-
tions upon the frontier and that some of the maurauders were from the
United States. When renewed appeals from Texans began to pour into
Camp Sabine, he was convinced Mexicans were once more encouraging
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the tribesmen to take the war path. Infonnation regarding the destruction
of Ft. Parker on May 18 was received before the end of the month.
On Jt:.ne 16. Sterling C. Robertson addressed Gaines an anguished appeal:!''t
and on June 18 General Rusk, then at Victoria in command of the Texas
anny, forwarded an urgent request for help,:!4
General Gaines believed Texans wished to be annexed to the United
States and that President Jackson wanted to see this occur before he
left office. Personally he thought annexation a wise policy, good for all
concerned including "the whole people of the continent of America," and
he feared "embarrassing interference by foreign powers might result from
delaying our national action upon the subject to another session of Con·
gress!' Therefore, on June 28 he renewed the call for "olunteers and
sent Acting Inspector General E. A. Hitchcock to Washington to report
the facts and circumstances as they appeared on the frontier, including
the readiness of the army to proceed with any assignment it might be
given.:!:;
He was convinced the time for annexation had arrived and planned for
quick and decisive military action. He replied to Robertson's request for
help that it was not clear the Caddoes had taken part in the recent out·
rages but the evidence was sufficient to justify an investigation as soon
as the dragoons that he had ordered from Ft. Jesup arrived at Camp
Sabine. He also requested all available helpful facts such as place
designations with intervening distances, the names of individuals along
the roads who might supply information of topogrn hy as well as enemy
numbers a:ld locations.:!8
On July 10, 1836, Ge!leral Gaines addressed an order with an enclosure
to the "officers commanding the United States troops at or near Texas."
This went to Ft. Towson. It said that infonnation had been received
that among the Indians who had recently raided Rob~rtson's colony were
some members of tribes residing within the states of Arkansas and
Louisiana. Therefore, he deemed it proper, in order to learn to what
extend these Indians had participated in the attack and at the same time
to restrain future incursions into Texas to direct the officer's attention
to the matter. For these purposes the Commandant at Ft. Towson was
ordered to repair with the forces under his command to the "town of
Nac08'doches where he would from time to time be occasionally stationed.u:!;
The message was forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Whistler then
at Camp Benson near Ft. Towson in command ot the troops who had been
ordered from Ft. Gibson to duty between Ft. Towson and Ft. Jesup.
Whistler with three companies of dragoons and six companies of infantry
had le'Ct Ft. Gibson on May 8, and after a rough and tedious march of nine
days, a distance of 190 miles, encamped near Red River on the 17 where
they had remained awaiting further orders. They supposed their des·
tination would be the Sabine but were now directed to Nacogdoches where
]7,400 rations had been sent. This consisted of 17,000 rations of flour with
a "like quantity ot the small parts ot the rations together with 8,600
rations of pork, with authority for a supply of beef, sufficient to complete
the whole supply of 17,400 rations.UtA
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At Nacogdoches a position was to be taken that would "combine the
several advantages of st1'ength, health and comfort." The camp was to be
fortified by a small breastwork constructed oI light materials with block
houses at the opposite angles. The primary object of the occupation
was to enable General Gaines to carry into effect instructions from the
War Department dated May 12. If Colonel Whistler should find Indians
from the niled Stales to be hostile, they were to be urged to return
to their villages and remain peaceful. But should these or "any other
Indians, or other anned forces, be found with a warlike attitude, or in
the act oI any decided hostility against the United States troops, or
against an)' oI the inhabitants of the frontier, or of the cUsputed territory
to the south, or east, or north of Nacogdoches, to employ force or other-
wise restrain them from such hostility" and to notify the commanding
officer "of their position, 'Probable ?lumber and conduct." Whistler was
promised full cooperation and support of the troops at Ft. Towson and
Camp Sabine but was cautioned to attack only if hostility was demon-
strated by conduct rather than by threats and always to be careful to
conform to the enclosure Irom the War Department.:!·
On July 11 Gaines' Order o. 29 stated there were indications that
Indians in the area were making preparations for hostilities during the
summer and autumn. Upon this hypothesis all military movements along the
border were based and such activities were to be restrained by force if
necessary. To guard against surprise it was ordered that on any service ~
Quiring a detachment be sent on duty expected to last two days or more, no
less than 200 infantrymen nor 150 mou.nted troops were to be employed.30
This precaution was dictated by experience gained fighting the Seminoles.
On July 31 the troops arrived at Nacogdoches. Portions of a letter pub-
lished in the National Intelligence.,., September 15, 1836, describes the
march from Ft. Towson. The trip took two weeks. Part of the country
had never been traveled beIore except by men on horseback and as the
troops were encumbered with ox teams, it was necessary to cut a road
as they advanced. The distance covered was about 200 miles. Camp was
made on a low hill upon "which Nacogdoches partly stands." The "firing
of a small piece oI artillery on" their approach told of a favorable re~
ception. The residents were "extremely polite and obliging but many of
them have leIt the town in consequence of the hostile attitude of the
neighboring Indians, who are said to be so numerous, that some do not
consider the town safe notwithstanding the presence of United States
troops." The situation was greatly improved by the arrival of General Hous-
ton with his staff on the evening of August 3. The General was suffering
Irom the wound received at San Jacinto and was still on crutches but
his presence cheered and encouraged the townspeople.'t
Residents of Nacogdoches were pleased to have the troops stationed in
their midst. They recognized communications were poor, transportation
difficult, and that a shortage of provisions would create problems. Freight
(rom tatchitoches was contracted for, when teams and wagons were
available, at S3.50 per hundred pounds but there were few teams and
wagons as well as a scarcity of drivers. Two barrels of flour per day were
required Ior the troops and it was difficult to secure a continuous supply.
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Other provisions were likewise scarce and expensive. Local citizens wished
the soldiers to remain and Colonel Henry Raguet infonned the supply officer
that he would furnish some provisions at reduced prices. Beans and black-
eyed peas he would provide for $1.50 per bushel, the contract price was $2.00
plus transportation; candles, one fourth wax, at 20 cents per pound, and
salt at $2.50 per bushel of fifty pounds."
General Gaines continued to strengthen his forces along the border while
awaiting what he confidently believed would be favorable action on the
Question of annexation. He was convinced the hostile attitude of the Indians
was a result of their belief that concentration of Mexican troops at Mata-
moros would lead to the Texans being driven back into the United States
or suffering extermination. A display of strength, he thought highly
desirable, therefore, he built at Camp Sabine a block house and eight
storehouses twenty feet square, laid in a supply of 2,290 bushels or corn,
and "155,000 rations of subsistence of e.xcellent quality,"' and wrote
the Secretary of War the best plan of attack was to march directly toward
the place where the Indian women and children were located. This would
bring the warriors from their hiding and assure a fight.u While these plans
were being readied, General Gaines was ordered, early in Ocober, to attend
a military court of inquiry at Frederick, Maryland.a•
The Mexican threat had not materialized, the Indians had not taken the
warpath, Washington had become cautious and no other military com-
mander recognized a need for action. General Arbuckle at Ft. Towson, left
in command, saw no evidence of a threat of widespread Indian hos-
tilities.J .5
There appeared to be no further political or military advantage to be
gained by continued occupation of Nacogdoches. The camp was plagued
with indifference and low morale. On August 9, the three ranking officers,
Colonel Whistler, Captain Tenor and Captain Perkins were ill. The block~
houses ordered constructed had not been built. The dragoons were Ilencamped
on a hill overlooking and commanding the town from the west," while
the infantry was stationed "within the precinct of the town,"SI Early
in September, Colonel Whistler reported there had ne"er been any disposition
on the part of the Indians to attack the U. S. troops and if there had eyer
been any intention to attack the Texans, it disappeared with the arrival
of the American soldiers.s; On October 13 he complained that his troops
had suffered a 400 mile march to afford protection to a foreign state.38
On November 30 General Macomb reported as far as he could det.ennine
there were 428 United States regulars at Nacogdoches.3D The detachment
was withdrawn on December 18, 1836.4 1) The climate of public opinion
at Washington had changed and along the boundary the Indian menace
had become a domestic problem.
DIPLOMATIC BREAK WITH MEXICO
The concentration of troops on the border, the occupation of Nacog~
doches, and the suspected intentions or the administration and of General
Gaines raised questions that were reflected in the foreign policy and
politics of the American people. The well known sympathies of President
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Jackson and citizens throughout the l,;nited States for Texans and their
cause resulted in widespread disregard of the eutrality Act of 1818. In
the latter part of 1835 and early 1836 violations of the spirit if not the
letter of the law were frequent, general and flagrant but repeated warn-
ings from the State Department and im'estigations by federal district
attorneys failed to halt aid going to Texas.fl
:\Iexican authorities were not satisfied that Washington was doing all
it could to maintain a neutral position. The situation was more difficult
because Mexico resented repeated efforts by the United States to buy the
province and indignantly rejected the claim that the Neches, not the Sabine,
was the boundary. President Jackson did nothing to allay suspicion when
in his message to Congress December 7, 1835, he reported having notified
l\'lexico that in the event of trouble, the boundary must be respected alike
by both the loyal and rebel regimes. Costillo, the Mexican envoy to Wash-
ington, inquired at the State Department if this meant the President
referred to boundaries other than those described in treaties between
the two governments."~ Secret3l'y Forsyth refused to discuss the statement
of the President, made to another branch of the government, with the
representatives of a foreign power.
Early in March, 1836, Manuel Edwardo Gorostiza appeared in the United
States as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Mexi-
ean government.u He was an able and experienced diplomat and on April
4 complained to Forsyth about men being recruited and money subscribed
in some of the states for aid to Texas."" The Secretary directed federal
attorneys to see that the law was enforced but the looseness of the leg-
islative language and the disposition of the public prevented successful
prosecution of seemingly obvious violations.
The boundary between the two nations had never been located and that
portion forming the western limits of Arkansas and Louisiana was in
dispute. Gorostiza leamed that General Gaines had been ordered to take
personal command and to concentrate troops along the border. On April
20 in a conference with Secretary of State Forsyth, he requested an
explanation."~
The Secretary entered into a long discourse on the subject. Gorostiza
said he was afraid he had not kept everything that was said in mind and
might have missed some of the points as they were presented in a foreign
language, therefore, requested a summary in writing. Forsyth agreed and
sent the envoy a memorandum. In this he declared that United States
citizens near Red River feared attacks by Indians from Me.xican territory
and hostilities by Indians living in the United States against people living
in Mex.ico. This had induced the government to send troops to the border
but Mexico need have no fear, for if in the perfonnance of his duties,
the commander crossed the line or occupied a position beyond what
Mexico supposed was the boundary, he would withdraw as soon as the
danger was passed. Washington had no intention of hostile action or
desire to establish a possession or claim.u
Gorostiza replied that sending troops to the border could be regarded
b)' his country only as intervention in its domestic affairs. To his own
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government he wrote the measure could be viewed in no other light
than aid to the Texas rebels and that he would never consent for the
Americans to occupy onc foot of Mexican soil. Should he learn the boundary
had been crossed, before receiving instructions on the subject, he would
lodge a formal protest and ask for his passport.47
Forsyth supposed Gorostiza had failed to grasp his meaning and tried
to explain. He said troops might be advanced to a position supposed br
Mexico to be within its territory. This was meant to be reassuring for
he had stated if it occurred, the soldiers would be withdrawn when peace
was restored, as the United States had no wish or intention to interfere
in the domestic affairs of its neighbor.~" Gorostiza replied that he noted
with approval the assurances that United Stales troops would not take
a position on ground known to be be)fond United States limits. Then he
inquired if this were true, woulcJ it not follow logically that no position
would be occupied on ground previously possessed by )Iexico."U
His failure to be convincing and the adroitness of the :Uexican, nettled
Forsyth. He tried again, repeating what he had said in slightly different
words with additional emphasis.~" Gorostiza insisted that his arguments had
not been met nor his question answered. Therefore, nothing remained
but for him to notify his government in order that the Mexican com-
mander might be given necessary instructions to deal with the situation
if General Gaines advanced beyond the known boundary line.til
On May 9, Gorostiza. returned to the subject. He inquired about a report
in the Globe that Secretary of War Cass on April 25 had authorized
General Gaines to advance to Nacogdoches, said to be within the limits of
the United States..\~ Fors)oth was irritated and replied at length emphasizing
that Gaines was not ordered to go to Nacogdoches, but rather not to go
beyond that point. He said this was an important distinction and the
language had been chosen carefully with the deliberate intention of avoid-
ing misconstruction of the motive, which was to protect the frontier
against the Indians. In fulfillment of the treaty terms, however, he
declared troops might be sent to the very heart of )Iexico. Believing the
protest was founded upon the minister's \\;1 Cui contentiousness or mis-
taken conviction that the advance was to be used as a basis for a claim to
territory, he proceeded to remind Gorostiza that Mexico was not in
possess of the area near the boundary no matter where the line might
be when finally established, and claims of both countries were based upon
terms of a treaty which provided that the line would be located latcr
by a joint commission.:l3 Gorostiza refused to admit the troops oC a
friendly power were authorized to enter, of their own accord, territory
of a neighbor no matter how benevolent their objective. Such practice,
he declared, would destroy the principle of the independence of nations.~·"
The discussion appeared to be nearing a crisis when the news of San
Jacinto brought a change. Gorostiza realized his position had been weak-
ened but he did not abandon it. On May 24 he protested against a
resolution introduced in Congress to recognize the independ nce of Texasllr;
Forsyth refused to discuss the subject and Gorostiza was quiet for a while
but on July 9 he was informed that his government was determined to
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prosecute the war in Texas and considered any agreement or promise
.. made by Santa Anna as null and ,·oid. Soon he heard that Gaines had
again received permission to OCCUP)' Nacogdoches. He inquired at the
State Department regarding the truth of the report. Forsyth replied that
he did not know but would ask the \VaT Department, and later he told
Gorostiz8 the 1"Umor was false. lI l!
•
•
•
On July 28 Gorostiza wrote Acting Secretary of State Dickins that he
had heard General Gaines had announced his intention to occupy Nacog-
doches. He obsen'ed that it was a ""ery singular coincidence that only when
the Mexican troops were advancing in Texas. those accounts of the excesses
of Indians are invented or exaggerated, in order that they may, without
doubt, rench the ears of General Gaines." He also complained of a series
of unneutral acts on the part of United States citizens and asked that
this communication be laid before the President as the continuation of his
mission depended upon the answer/" A reply on August 1 defended the
Secretary of War in orderin~ General Gaines to go as Car as Nacogdoches
and reiterated the deetaralion that the United States sought only to
presen'e peace and order along the border/'~
On August 2, Gorostiza inquired if the government had confirmation
of reports that Genel1l1 Gaines had occupied Nacogdoches.IID He was told
the last disl)atches receivcd at the War Department indicated the General
was at Camp Sabine. Two days later. Augu t 4, he presented a strong
protest against the order authorizing the occupation of Nacogdoches; on
the same theory hc said, a :'o1exican general might occupy Natchitoches
to protect against Tndians that might be reported planning to enter
Mexico.en
He knew Gaines was authorized to occupy acogdoches but was unable
to learn whether troops had been sent to that position. He did learn that
authorization had been dispatched the day before Forsyth had told him
he was not informed on the subject. He wrote his government, HI think
that no commentaries are needed, to show the true character and value
of such conduct."111 Any confidence he might have had in the honesty and
integrity of the American administration \\'3fol completely destroyed.
With no expectation of influencing the action of the United States
government Gorostiz3 continued to call attention to alleged unneutral acts.
On September 10 he \note that he was convinced Nacogdoches had been
occupied and called for replies to his protests.G2 Tn a personal interview
September 23, Forsyth sought, without success, to allay the indignant
minister's apprehensions and two days latel" showed him parts of letters
from President Jackson to General Gaines in which the President di~
reeted wilhdl"3wal from Nacogdoches if the Indian menace was over.
However, if hostilities were threatened or in progress, he was authorized
Lo cnll 2000 volunteers from Arkansas and )1issouri and advance his entire
force to acogdoches or any other position more favorable for the pro-
tection of the fronticr. The letters specifically informed Gaines that he
was to act upon his own discretion based upon the information available
to him, bearing in mind the neutral position of his country.u
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Gorostiza knew he was achieving nothing and had lost hope of any
success but on October 1, he protested against United States military aid to
Te.xas and demanded a repl:r to his request Cor withdrawal of troops from
acogdoches.o• On October 13, Acting Secretary of State Dickins refused
to promise withdrawal.s:; Gorostiza realized the resources of diplomac:r
were exhausted and on October 15 asked for his passport.u
JACKSON'S CHANGE OF E)[PHASIS
President Jackson approved military action along the Arkansas-Louisiana
boundary when the revolt in Texas first came to his attention. This he
indicated in his annual message to Congress December 7, 1835, then
emphasized more strongly in March. 183G, when a letter from General T. J.
Green to Colonel J. B. Manny in command at Ft. Jesup reached him by way
of the Adjutant General's office. This was an appeal for protection against
Indians alleged to be crossing from the nited States to Texas. Jackson
wrote on the letter a message to the Secretary of War directing him
to give instructions immediately to the commanding officer at Ft. Jesup
to flarrest all individuals who under the order of General Santa Anna,
are engaged in exciting Indians to war. and to notify all concerned that
aU his militar)' forces will be employed to put down or support our
neutrality."e.
The administration decided to mobilize enough troops to enforce its
will along the border. General Gaines was placed in command and for-
warded instructions by Secretary of War Cass dated April 25, 1836 au-
thorizing him to occupy Nacogdoches if in his opinion it seem advisable.o ol
On April 8. before Cass' letter was written, Gaines called on the governors
for volunteers,09 and by order of the President, the call was approved
before Congress enacted the necessary legislation.70 Details of this action
soon became known and from numerous quarters questions and criticism
appeared.
iles Register, ::'i1a)' 7, stated that General Gaines appeared to feel
called upon to prevent Indians from taking part in the war then raging
in Texas. He was quoted as saying orders from the President required
him "to remain entirely neutral and to cause that neutrality to be re-
spected." The editor observed that the General could interpret his orders
to authorize military action as far west as the Sabine and if he did
so, war with Mexico might be precipitated. The conclusion of such a
conflict could not be foreseen and "we trust that however strong sym-
pathies in favor of our countrymen who are emigrants in Texas may be,
nothing \\;11 be done by an American officer to tarnish the high character
of the United States for national propriety and good faith." This was
the first mention in the Register of the situation, and it did not go un-
noticed at Washington.Tl
The next issue was more severe in its crit.cism and attacked the President
directly. It declared the Texas question had assumed an entirely new
aspect so far as the United States was concerned. The Executive had
undertaken to claim territory over which the Mexican government had
theretofore exercised jurisdiction, including "Old Fort Nacogdoches" and
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had ordered General Gaines to cross the Sabine and occupy that post. In the
opinion of this paper, under no construction of the treaties could United
States boundaries be considered to include Nacogdoches. The editor felt
"so clear indeed is this question that no person, even moderately ac-
Quainted with the geographr of the country on both sides of the Sabine
would any more regard the Neches as the main stream of the Sabine
than they would the Shenandoah as the main stream of the Potomac or
the Juaniata as that of the Susquehannah." The hope was expressed that
Mexico would not resort to war but under no construction of treaties
could the l:nited States boundaries be considered to include Nacogdoches.
In the opinion of the editor, he would be wanting in his duty to his
readers "if he did not warn them of the imminent danger of the nation
being involved in a war which could not be otherwise than disasterous
to the western frontier no matter how fortunate we may be in its prose-
cution or victorious in termination." So long as there were no "latent
ulterior purposes" there was no objection on the part of the Register to
any measure to protect the frontier but t.his had the appearance of a mask
for conquest.;:
Criticism spread and on May la, the National lntelligencer published
a letter written by General l\'lacomb dated April 25, in which he ques-
tioned General Gaines' judgment in calling upon the governors for volun·
teers. The letter was assumed to give the true picture, and editorially the
paper attacked the administration's policy.·:t Criticism in Congress was also
increased and its overall strength was not easy to determine.14 The ad-
ministration was impressed. If Macomb's letter presented the real situa-
tion, the President feared a mounting crusade of opposition and it was
decided this might be prevented by a restatement of policy designed to
end criticism in the press, discussion in Congress, and to rally the public
to the administration's support. Information on the situation in the Presi-
dent's possession had been called for by Congress. A reply was withheld
and on May 12, Secretary Cass wrote General Gaines that the President
wished him to act with great caution and in no way compromise the na-
tion's neutrality. If Indians were not then employed along the border,
there was no need to pass beyond territory heretofore occupied by the
United States. In any event he was not to advance unless circumstances
showed the step necessary for the protection of United States territory
and then to return across the line as soon as the situation would permit. is
There could be little if any criticism of such policy and on May 14 the
correspondence, including this letter, was sent to Congress. The procedure
was effective, criticism abated.
Policy wa~ not changed but an element of caution had been introduced.
On July 11, however, Secretary Cass replied to Gaines' letter of the
previous June 7, saying that if the General considered it necessary he
might advance as far as Nacogdoches without hesitation since the Presi-
dent approved.':· This was directly contrary to the impression conveyed
by the letter of May 12. Jackson had seen danger signals and when Gaines
renewed his call for volunteers, the Chief Executive took measures to
forestall a revival of criticism.17
Delays incidental to the adjournment of Congress and the President's trip
to Tennessee afforded. the needed time for deliberate action. Jackson decided
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to halt recruiting of volunteers in the states where there was the greatest
enthusiasm for the Texas cause and most persistent demands for annexa-
tion. This would tend to reduce consideration of the subject where there
was most pressure (or action. On August 5 from the Hermitage, Jackson
wrote Governor Cannon of Tennessee that he believed the sanction of so
large a mobilization as called fOT b). General Gaines would furnish )Iexico
reasons for supposing the United States might be persuaded by inadequate
cause to overstep the line of strict neutrality. He criticized Cannon for
assuming that authorization for a requisition in May applied equally to
another in June and declared Gaines had based the latest call upon
obligations inconsistent with the administration's policy.18
Writing apparently for public view, Jackson told Cannon "should Mexico
insult our flag, invade our ten'itory or interfere with our citizens in their
lawful pursuit then the Government would promptly repel the insult and
take speedy reparation for the injury." No such offense, he s<'\id, had
been committed or believed by General Gaines to have been committed.
Before he left Washington, he asserted, the Secretary of War had been di·
rected to infonn General Gaines of a new plan that had been made under
the Volunteer Act approved by the last session of Congress. This gave
Gaines the authority, in case of need, to call up 1000 men from each of the
states of Arkansas and ;\Jissouri, at the same time \\;thdrawing authority
for requisitions upon the other governors. He belie\'ed there were no rea-
sons to justify fear of extensive Indian hostilities but should more troops
be needed, they could be called from Ohio, Indiana, flIinois and Kentucky.':"l!
Critics were again silenced. On August 20 an editorial in Niles Re!li~tel'
stated that the letter was "dignified and appropriate and must disabuse
the public mind as to the alleged sentiments and conduct of that func-
tionary in the contest of the Texians with Mexico." It had appeared
from reports by General Gaines that he was acting with the sanction and
upon the advice of the President, this was now proved not be be the
case.80 The National Intelligencer was quoted as saying "we consider
the document to be of an importance scarcely inferior to that of the
proclamation of neutrality of 1793."81
Jackson's ultimate goal had not changed. He wanted Texas; he also
wanted Van Buren to succeed him at the White House; and he was waiting
for a report from Henry Morfit, his agent in Texas. His reasons for halting
troop concentration on the border were: first, he feared criticism would
hurt Van Buren's chances of being ele<:ted; second, he did not want to
make the annexation of Texas more difficult by giving opponents grounds
for opposition; and third, he believed Texas was in no immediate danger
of being conquered by a weak, divided, and discouraged Mexico. Unlike
General Gaines, he did not think it absolutely necessary to annex Texas
during the life of the present Congress. '12
On September 4 the President wrote General Gaines that his policy was
as it had always been, strict neutrality "unless the necessity exists, unless
there are actual disturbances of the peace on the frontier, or a moral cer-
tainty that the Indians in hostile array for the purpose are drawing the
means of operation from the territory of Mexico the occupation of an
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advanced post in that territory by our troops must be avoided."u Before
this message was sent, Jackson received the letter Gaines had written
Secretary Cass on July 21 in which he described reports of renewed
activities by Indians in Texas. In reply the President authorized the
General if the statements were true, to occupy Nacogdoches with his
entire command.s4
Jackson conveyed one impression to the public and an entirely different
one to General Gaines. The technique was successful and General Gaines
did what he could to promote the cause of annexation and the public lauded
the President for his finn stand in protecting American rights and preserv-
ing "strict neutrality."
JEALOUS GENERALS
Military activity along the Texas border added fuel to an ancient con-
troversy among the generals of the army. Generals Gaines and Scott
began feuding before the War of 1812 closed, but they both emerged
as Brevit Major Generals. This resulted in a continuation of their personal
war since each hoped to retain the pay of the brevit rank. In 1821 the
number of Major Genern.ls in the army was reduced to one by act of
Congress. Gaines and Scott were applicants for the place, each con-
sidered the other to be the principal obstacle in the way of his promotion.
Bitterness between them increased until in 1824 Scott challenged Gaines
to a duel. Gaines haughtily refused to fight because army regulations for-
bade and he had consistently opposed "the code duelle." His friends de-
fended him and pointed out that Scott had drawn the anti-dueling pro-
vision in llrmy regulations and had refused to fight Jackson because of
IIpatl;otic sCJ1Jples."8:1
In February, 1828, G neral in Chief of the army, Jacob Brown, died
and the Adams administration had to select a successor. An active cam-
paign was launched by both Gaines and Scott. Partisans of each joined
in the contest. Charges and counter charges, letters and pamphlets were
issued in great numbers. Congressmen brought what pressure they could
upon the administration. In general, representatives from the Northwest
favored William H. Harrisonj those from the upper South urged the
claims of Scott; New England backed Macombj and the lower South
supported Gaines. In addition each had partisans scattered across the
states.8G
In the cabinet the appointment was a matter of grave consideration.
The President was annoyed with both Gaines and Scott as well as with
the tactics of their friends. Secretary of State Clay was bitterly opposed
to Gaines because he considered himself to have been insulted in 1825 by
Lieutenant Edward G. W. Butler, an aide to Gaines. The General had
tendered his apologies but Clay threatened to resign from the cabinet if
he received the appointment.'" On an occasion when the appointment was
the subject of discussion, the President asked Richard Rusk, Secretary of
the Treasury, his opinion. Rusk objected to both Gaines and Scott and
suggested Alexander Macomb, Brevet Brigadier General and Chief En-
gineer of the Army..... This seemed an acceptable way out of the empass
38 East Tezas Historical Journal
and Macomb received the appointment which served to broaden the con-
troversy and intensify the bitterness. Gaines, Scott and their friends
were indignant. They loosed a barrage of criticism of the appointment and
the appointee. Scott announced he would not obey orders from Macomb
and on at least two occasions refused to return the salute of his superior.lI11
Gaines publicly supported Jackson's candidacy for the presidency in
1828 and was jubilant at his election. On November 22, after the results
were known, he wrote the President-elect congratulations and invited
him, if he came by Kingsport, Tennessee, on his way to Washington, to stay
at least one night with the Gaines family.io This friendship gradually cooled
until by 1830 Gaines felt he was no longer in the good graces of the
President. He attributed this to his known dislike of Eaton, Jackson's
first Secretary of War; his approval of Jackson's earlier decision not to
seek a second term; and the influence yielded by the political friends of
Scott and Macomb.
On January 23, 1836 General Gaines was transferred to the Arkansas-
Louisiana border from the command in Florida and General Scott was
ordered to assume direction of the campaign against the Seminoles. This
war was being waged in an area where the President had won military
fame and was supposed to have an especial knowledge and interest in
the activities. General Gaines had achieved some success in organizing
the campaign and in the fighting he felt that he was destined to achieve
total victory, so Scott's appointment was resented and attributed to
political manipulations at Washington.91 Tn the new command the situation
was different, conditions would have to be appraised, plans made, troops
and equipment procured and if success were achieved, it might be at-
tributed to factors other than military leadership. Gaines felt his rival
was being favored.
Each general, with the support of his friends, continued to seek oppor-
tunities to promote his professional career. General Macomb learned that
Gaines had called upon several governors including White of Louisiana
for volunteers. No official action was taken at Baton Rouge and on April
25 Macomb wrote Secretary of War that the governor thought he was
not authorized by law to honor the requisition. He was reporting the affair,
he said, because it was understood troops were to be used to check the
Caddoes and this seemed unnecessary since the country was not invaded
and not likely to be. He suggested that General Gaines had been deceived
by a group of land speculators who had led him to believe Mexican author-
ities were tampering with the Indians in the hope of stimulating people
in the United States to pressure authorities to lend aid to Texas. He
declared that General Gaines had enough soldiers of the regular army to
carry out his instructions. ll :!
Macomb's criticisms had little basis in fact and should have carried no
weight in administrative circles. He was known to be jealous of Gaines,
had not been near the frontier, knew of the situation only by rumor and
what he had read in the public press. In addition. he misrepresented the
position of Governor White who had explained that he hesitated to call
out the militia because of lack of funds and, since the legislature was not
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in session, before the men could be mobilized the time for service specified
in the call would have expired. But the subject of the principal persons
involved were controversial and Macomb's letter found its way into the
newspapers and provoked discussion over the country and in Congress.
Niles Register charged that General Gaines was irresponsible and was
about to start a war that would blight the high character of his country.93
Friends of the generals were again arrayed in defense of their respective
champions. Many of the men in public life in 1828 were still influential
and few appear to have changed their opinions regarding the merits or
demerits of the military leaders. The discussion in Congress resulted in a
call upon the President for all the documents relating to the frontier and
General Gaines.V4 The administration determined to permit no disturbing
political issues to arise, and moved cautiously. The Secretary of War
wrote Gaines to restrict his activities, if feasible, to United States soil.
Gaines protested that Macomb's letter had produced a change in the think-
ing on the Potomac, he had only 1600 men to defend 400 miles of frontier
-" and had Gen. Macomb been acquainted with the situation he would never
have committed so many eTTors.a:;
•
•
Bickering continued and when news reached Washington that troops had
occupied Nacogdoches, charges and countercharges were renewed. Amos
Kendall, one of the President's trusted advisers, urged that Gaines be
recalled.8e This advice was not followed but Jackson did scold Gaines, not
for what he did, but for permitting a distorted image of administrative
policy to emerge as a threat to the uneasy calm of national politics.
The four and a half months occupation left little imprint upon Nacog-
doches and East Te.xas. It did, however, make Nacogdoches, the Sabine
River, and East Texas well known to people in the United States. It also
brought about a break in diplomatic relations between Washington and
Mexico, produced criticism which stimulated President Jackson to action
that in men of lesser stature might have been regarded as duplicity, and
sen'ed as a vehicle for the return, as a political issue, of the ancient rivalry
between generals of the army.
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